







Lancaster University Management School 


















The Department of Economics                        
Lancaster University Management School 




©Steve Bradley and Pam Lenton  
All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed 
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission, 
provided that full acknowledgement is given. 
 
The LUMS Working Papers series can be accessed at http://www.lums.co.uk/publications 






A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION TO DROP OUT OF POST-
COMPULSORY EDUCATION* 
 
Discussion Paper version  
 
Steve Bradley and Pam Lenton 










In this paper we analyse the magnitude, timing, determinants and outcomes of dropping out of post-
compulsory education over the period 1985-94. We use data from the Youth Cohort Surveys for 
England and Wales to estimate non-parametric single and competing risks duration models 
allowing for the effects of unobserved heterogeneity and time varying covariates. By the mid-1990s 
approximately 1 in 10 young people dropped out of post-compulsory education, especially in April 
and July. Dropouts were more likely to get jobs rather than become unemployed and the most 
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   1.   Introduction 
 
In this paper we analyse the incidence, timing, determinants and outcomes of dropping out of post-
compulsory education.
1 This is potentially an important policy issue, because it has been shown 
that individuals who drop out of education without gaining any form of qualification face a higher 
probability of unemployment, including long-term unemployment, and lower lifetime earnings 
(Markey, 1988). Society also gains an uneducated worker, resulting in foregone productivity, 
increased benefit payments and higher crime rates. In Britain, increasing the proportion of young 
people in post-compulsory education has been seen as one means of reducing the so-called ‘skills 
gap’ (Keep and Mayhew, 1999; Prais, 1995). A high drop out rate may militate against the 
achievement of that objective. It has also been argued that a high drop out rate from post-
compulsory education reflects inefficiency in this sector of education, primarily due to poor 
management. Identification of the determinants of dropping out may therefore provide managers 
with the necessary information to reduce this problem. 
 
In the US there has been considerable debate regarding the problem of high school dropouts (Toby 
1989; Finn 1989; Toby and Armor 1992) but very little research has been conducted for the UK. In 
fact, what research has been conducted for the UK has either been conducted by educationalists 
(e.g. Hodkinson and Bloomer, 2001) or has focused on dropouts from higher education 
(Arulampalam, Naylor and Smith, 2002 and 2003; Johnes and McNabb, 2002; Booth and Satchell 
1995; Johnes and Taylor 1991). Most of these studies use cross-sectional data and therefore ignore 
the timing of the decision to drop out of education and the impact of unobserved heterogeneity.   
  
This paper attempts to fill this research gap by answering the following questions. First, what is the 
magnitude of dropping out from post-compulsory education in the UK? Second, what are the 
determinants of the decision to drop out? Third, how does the decision to drop out vary over the 
period of study in post-compulsory education? Fourth, do young people drop out for jobs, or are 
they more likely to become unemployed? To answer these questions we pool data from several 
Youth Cohort Surveys (YCS), which cover the period 1985-94, a period of rapid increase in post-
compulsory participation rates in the UK.
2 We model this data using the techniques of duration 
                                                 
1 In England and Wales young people complete their compulsory schooling at the age of 16, and then proceed to a 
period of continued education, typically up to the age of 18, prior to entrance to the labour market or university. The 
period of education between 16-18 is voluntary and is referred to throughout this paper as post-compulsory education. 
2 In 1984 the staying on rate was comparatively low with only 41% of all 16 year olds entering post-compulsory 
education, whereas by 1994 this figure had risen to 71%.  
   analysis, which enables us to control for unobservable differences between individuals, and to 
incorporate time varying covariates. Of particular importance in this latter case is the effect of the 
local unemployment rate and the number of vacancies, which are allowed to vary by month and by 
Local Authority District (LAD).
3    
  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we briefly discuss the 
standard theoretical framework used to describe the decision to drop out, and then review the 
existing literature. Section 3 describes the data and discusses the non-parametric duration modeling 
techniques that we adopt to model these data. In section 4 we discuss our findings in relation to the 
questions raised above. This section also addresses the potential problem of attrition that exists in 
most panel data sets, and presents some evidence for the YCS. This is followed by our conclusions 
and a discussion of the implications for policy. 
 
2.   Theory and literature review   
 
The theoretical framework that best explains the decision to invest in education is the human 
capital model (Becker 1964). According to this approach, an individual will invest in education as 
long as the discounted expected returns to education to the individual are greater than or equal to 
the costs of the investment. The return to the investment in education is increased lifetime earnings. 
The cost of education is the earnings foregone whilst studying and the direct costs of tuition and 
learning materials. Having made the initial decision to invest in post-compulsory education, it is 
therefore likely that the individual had calculated that the benefits outweighed the costs. This 
framework provides some clues as to why some individuals subsequently drop out of education. 
One possibility is that they may have either over-estimated the wage premium associated with 
education or may have under-estimated the costs and, with a time lag, subsequently adjust their 
calculation of the net return to investment in education. Since some young people may be better 
able to make the initial calculation, it is expected that any over-estimation of the returns to 
education will vary with individual and family characteristics. A second possibility is that there 
may be changes in the state of the local labour market, which could also lead to a revaluation of the 
costs and benefits associated with remaining in education. For instance, local wages may rise or the 
unemployment rate may fall, hence causing foregone costs to rise. A third possibility is that the 
                                                 
3 The Local Authority District is regarded in this study as a self-contained labour market because young people tend to 
be less geographically mobile than adults and they are therefore likely to respond to ‘local’ labour market conditions. 
   psychic, or non-pecuniary, costs of continuing in education may rise which then leads a young 
person to drop out. These costs could include a change in tastes towards education or a loss of 
interest in the course of study. These factors are typically unobserved in the data, hence the need to 
control for them in the econometric modeling.   
  
As suggested earlier, there has been very little empirical work of dropout behaviour for the UK, 
which contrasts with the US where concern focuses on dropout rates from high school. However, 
since high school graduation in the US occurs at age eighteen, and post-compulsory education in 
the UK occurs between the ages of 16 to 18, we argue that the findings from US studies are 
relevant to our own work. One important caveat to this is that, whereas education up to the age of 
18 is compulsory in some states of the US, this is not the case in the UK where post-compulsory 
education is optional.
4 Thus being ‘forced’ to participate in education will be reflected in the US 
studies, but this is irrelevant in the UK context. 
  
The existing literature on dropout behaviour has analysed the influence of personal, family, peer 
group, schooling, local labour market and prior attainment variables. In terms of prior attainment, 
more able individuals are most likely to stay-on in education because the expected benefits are 
much higher and risks of failure (a cost) are lower (McElroy, 1996; Chuang, 1997; Ashenfelter and 
Rouse, 1998; Light and Stayer, 2000; Bishop and Mane, 2001). In fact, Eckstein and Wolpin 
(1999) find that ability and motivation are the most important factors influencing the completion of 
schooling levels for males. Evans and Schwab (1995), Sander and Krautman (1995), Neal (1997) 
and Nguyen and Taylor (2002) emphasise the effects of school background on the probability of 
high school graduation and the decision to enter college. Catholic school pupils are less likely to 
drop out and more likely to enter college (Nguyen, Taylor and Bradley, 2003).  
  
Ethnic differences in the decision to drop out are also found. Young people of black and Hispanic 
background are more likely to graduate from high school (Evans and Schwab, 1995; Nguyen et al, 
2003). One explanation for this finding may be that the opportunity cost of investing in education is 
lower if the individual perceives that this will lead to discrimination in the labour market.  
 
There is a large literature on the effect of family background on schooling decisions (Hanushek 
1992; Becker and Lewis 1973; Becker and Tomes 1976; Behrman and Taubman 1986; Manski et 
                                                 
4 In 1997, 11 states required the youth to attend school until age 18 (National Center for Education Statistics, 1998). 
   al, 1992; Sander et al, 1995 and Neal, 1997). Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) find that the probability 
of dropping out is increased for those pupils with less educated parents, a large number of siblings, 
low family income and living alone or with a single parent. Parental occupation is also likely to 
reflect attitudes to investment in education and the ability to cover the costs of education 
(Carpenter and Hayden, 1987; Koshal, Koshal and Marino, 1995; Armor, 1992).  
  
The state of the local labour market may also affect the decision to remain in education. Chuang 
(1994) finds that labour market factors exert a strong influence on the decision to re-invest in 
education. Young people invest in education when the labour market is slack (Card and Lemieux, 
2000), especially in the case of males (Markey, 1988; Cohany, 1986). This is a classic discouraged 
worker effect. 
 
3.  The data and econometric methods 
 
3.1   The data  
 
The data used in this analysis are the Youth Cohort Surveys of England and Wales, versions 2 to 6, 
which refer to the 1985-94 period.
5 Each YCS is comprised of three sweeps, conducted at the ages 
17, 18 and 19, and for each sweep the young person is asked to reflect back on the previous year, 
including in the first sweep their experiences and achievements at school, and their personal and 
family characteristics.
6 For young people proceeding to post-compulsory education, the Survey also 
collects information on the type of course taken, whether the young person sits their exams and the 
grades achieved. Another important feature of the YCS, which allows us to compute the length of 
stay in post-compulsory education, is the diary information. This records the educational and 
labour market status of all young people in each of 36 months since the completion of compulsory 
education.  
  
We take October following the end of compulsory schooling as our starting point for the analysis of 
dropout behaviour, even though most courses begin in mid-September.   Unfortunately, the YCS 
does not record whether a young person has dropped out or not. This has to be computed from two 
                                                 
5 When this researched was started, YCS2-YCS6 were the only versions of the Survey containing longitudinal 
information. YCS7-YCS9 now have longitudinal information, and therefore we hope to update the findings in this 
paper in the future.  
6 Specifically, young people are sent a postal questionnaire, which they are asked to complete and return. 
   pieces of information, as follows: (1) a respondent is recorded as a dropout if she leaves full-time 
post-compulsory education and does not return in the same academic year; and (2) the respondent 
does not sit for the exam or gain the qualification for which she was originally enrolled.  Young 
people can undertake courses that last either one or two academic years and this is the period in 
which they are ‘at risk’ of prematurely ending their education. Note that this time period includes 
the Easter vacation and the summer break between academic years. 
 
Our analysis of drop out behaviour is conditional on entry to post-compulsory education and we 
therefore exclude from the statistical analysis all individuals who entered the labour market at age 
16. We also model the dropout decision separately for males and females. In Tables 1 and 2 we 
report the sample sizes and the unconditional probability of dropping out for each covariate. The 
raw data show that 12% of males and 13% of females drop out of their courses, although this rate 
has decreased over time. For instance, for males the percentage dropping out decreased from 16.5% 
for those who entered post-compulsory education in October 1985 to 10.1% for those who entered 
in October 1991. The equivalent figures for females were 16.3% and 11.0%, respectively. These 
figures are broadly similar to those produced by the Audit Commission (1993), which showed that 
for England 13 per cent of young people on academic courses dropped out, whereas the equivalent 
figure for vocational courses was 18 per cent. This is reassuring and suggests that our measure of 
dropping out is accurate. Figures 1 and 2 show how dropping out varies over the period of study in 
post-compulsory education. It is clear that this is not constant, exhibiting large peaks in April 
(periods 6 and 18) of each year with a smaller peak in July (period 9).   
 
Tables 2 and 3 also show that young people with 5 or more GCSE grades A-C are less likely to 
drop out, and are roughly three times more likely to remain in education than the next best qualified 
group (i.e. those with 1-4 A-C grades). As we descend the attainment categories the proportion of 
dropouts increases although the differential between each category also declines. Dropout rates for 
ethnic groups show that Afro-Caribbean males are more likely to drop out than white males. For 
both genders, young people from a Bangladeshi or Pakistani background have a slightly higher 
probability of completing their courses whereas Indians have a dropout rate approximately 50% 
lower than whites. Students living in private housing also have a 50% lower (unconditional) 
probability of dropping out compared to young people who live in social housing. The only other 
notable findings are that students who live with neither parent have a much higher probability of 
dropping out, and drop out rates rise for young people with parents in lower occupational groups. 
    
3.2   Modelling the hazard of drop out   
 
Following Stewart (1996) and Andrews et al. (2002), we model the decision to drop out of post-
compulsory education as a hazard model using non-parametric techniques. The length of time from 
entering post-compulsory education to dropping out is represented by the non-negative random 
variable T. Here T is measured in discrete time intervals since our data is recorded at monthly 
intervals. The hazard rate is a measure of the probability that an event, dropping out, occurs at time 
t, conditional on it not having occurred before time t. Since the non-parametric estimation method 




A young person either graduates, or they drop out or they are censored i.e. they remain in 
education. We adopt a single risk and a competing risks framework, in the latter case distinguishing 
between dropping out to unemployment (ri = 1) and dropping out to employment (ri = 2). We 
assume that the hazards for each competing risk are mutually independent, which enables us to 
estimate a separate model for each risk or exit state.
8 For each model the data are organised into 
sequential binary response form (Prentice and Gloecker 1978, Meyer 1990, 1995) where all 
observations yij are zero except for the period in which a dropout to the risk in question occurs. 
Thus, young people who exit to unemployment, (ri = 1), for instance, are treated as censored at the 
point they exit in the hazard of exit to employment, (ri = 2). For each risk a panel of individuals is 
constructed with the i-th individual contributing j = 1, 2, …, ti observations. The maximum number 
of periods (months) that an individual can be at risk is 20.
9  Assuming proportional hazards we 
have: 
 
                    (1)  ) exp( ) ( β ' x ' x i j r
^
h i j r h =
where   is the hazard of exit for each j and to each state,  is the baseline hazard for each exit 







                                                 
7 This is equivalent to assuming an exponential survival in each time interval. 
8 For the single risk model ri = 1 and ri= 2 are combined. 
9 In the econometric analysis, since a young person cannot by definition be observed to start and quit post-compulsory 
education in the same month, we combine the October and November thereby giving a total of 20 time periods. 
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The explanatory variables affect the hazard by the complementary log-log link function: 
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Unobserved heterogeneity 
An issue that also has to be resolved is how to control for the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity. There may be unobserved differences between graduates and dropouts that are not 
recorded in the data, for example the level of motivation. Failure to control for unobserved 
differences between individuals may cause severe bias in the estimation of the baseline hazard  
(Heckman and Singer 1984, Lancaster 1990). Vandenberghe (2000) notes that the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity leads to over-estimated coefficients for negative duration dependence 
and under-estimated coefficients for positive duration dependence. Standard practice suggests that 
it is possible to control for unobserved heterogeneity by including a positive-valued random 
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where v represents the unobserved heterogeneity. The above model can be written as follows: 
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Two approaches have been used to model the unobserved heterogeneity. The first is to assume a 
particular parametric distribution for the heterogeneity term. In this case   in Equation (6) is 
replaced by parameters from, for instance, the Gamma or the Gaussian distribution. The Gaussian 
mixture model is considered superior where there are thought to be a great number of 
unobservables, hence these are most likely to approximate the normal distribution with mean of 
zero and variance σ
2.  However, there is a debate concerning the appropriate distributional form of 
the heterogeneity term. As the heterogeneity is unobservable there is often no justification for the 
choice of either parametric distribution. Moreover, the problem with specifying a parametric 
distribution for the heterogeneity term is that the estimated parameters may be sensitive to the 
particular distribution adopted, especially where the baseline hazard is not sufficiently flexible. An 
alternative approach suggested by Heckman and Singer (1984) is to use the mass point technique, 
which approximates a continuous distribution by a finite discrete distribution of unrestricted form. 
In this case,   and  are replaced by a discrete mass point approximation. We adopt the mass 
point method suggested by Heckman and Singer (1984) in this paper.  
) ( i u u f
i u ) ( i u u f
 
Marginal effects 
The vectors βr , r = 1,...2 are not marginal effects. The effect of a covariate on the probability of 
exit via risk r, (Πr), and the expected waiting time until exit via risk r, (Er), are dependent on both 
the hazards h1j,...,h2j via the overall survivor function. 
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We follow Thomas (1996) who notes that when proportional hazards are assumed, it is 
computationally much easier to focus on the probability of exit via state r conditional on exiting 
during the interval j, denoted Prj: 
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   The baseline hazards used to compute these are 
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The marginal effect of x on the conditional exit probability, given by 
 
















δ      (10) 
These marginal effects will sum to zero across all r, as they do in a multinomial logit because the 
summed conditional probabilities of exit for each r will necessarily equal one. As we have only two 
risk categories the marginal effects will necessarily be equal and of opposite sign. The expected 
waiting time is calculated by initially computing at the sample mean, then re-computed with 




4.1  The timing of the dropout decision 
 
Here we focus on the shape of the baseline hazards for each gender to each exit state. The non-
parametric baseline hazards for each gender to each exit state are shown in Figures 3 to 6.  
 
The shape of the baseline hazards reveals that the decision to dropout of post-compulsory education 
is not constant, but displays several spikes. There are large spikes towards the end of the period of 
study just before final examinations, which is a worrying finding. Students may be reluctant to sit 
examinations, preferring instead to search for work because job vacancies become available at the 
time of the peaks – April and July. In the case of females, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
shifts the hazard up in the case of dropping out to employment, whereas it is shifted downwards 
with respect to dropping out to unemployment. In fact, in the latter case the baseline hazard 
   becomes more or less flat, as in the case of males. These different shifts in the baseline hazards may 
suggest that the dropouts to employment are unobservably ‘good’ whereas those to unemployment 
are unobservably ‘bad’.     
  
The baseline hazards are difficult to compare between the genders and between exit states, 
therefore we compute transition intensities, which are shown in Figure 5. Note, that these 
conditional exit probabilities must sum to unity, helping to make it more obvious what exit state is 
most likely. It is clear from Figure 5 that it is more likely that young people drop out and enter 
employment. It is also clear that males do better than females since they have the highest 
conditional probability of exit into employment in every time period.  
 
4.2  The determinants of dropout behaviour and exit state 
 
The expected waiting time and marginal effects are reported for the competing risks models in 
Table 4 and Table 5. These Tables also report the coefficients for the single risk model, and the 
associated odds ratio to aid interpretation. The single risk estimates allow us to say what ‘type’ of 
young person is more likely to drop out, whereas the results of the competing risk model indicate 
which exit state is most likely conditional on having dropped out.    
 
The single risk estimates show that a higher level of prior attainment is associated with a lower risk 
of dropping out from post-compulsory education. The estimated coefficients are highly significant 
and show that having previously gained at least one GCSE pass lowers the risk of dropping out 
compared to having gained no GCSE grades. Comparing the marginal effects for the competing 
risks model, it is clear that if more qualified young people drop out, they are more likely to get a 
job. These effects are generally stronger for females than for males. Furthermore, the expected 
waiting time until dropping out increases as we move from the lowest GCSE category to the 
highest (i.e. GCSE2 to GCSE5). The differential in waiting times is greatest between the top two 
attainment categories, thus revealing the importance of obtaining at least five A-C grades on the 
likelihood of remaining in post-compulsory education.  
 
Pupils from comprehensive schools are more likely to drop out and become unemployed, especially 
in the case of females. Young people who previously attended a grammar or independent school are 
less likely to drop out. The expected waiting times on the grammar/independent school variable are 
   positive for both exit states and for both genders. This indicates that these young people stay longer 
in post-compulsory education. However, the marginal effects for both genders reveal that those 
who do dropout increase their probability of entering unemployment and reduce their probability of 
entering employment. This may be because they search longer for the right kind of job, rather than 
simply accepting the first job that comes along.  
  
Young people from all ethnic backgrounds are less likely to drop out, especially in the case of 
Indians. All of the expected waiting times for non-white males and females for both exit states are 
positive, suggesting that they remain in post-compulsory education longer. However, the marginal 
effects from the competing risks models suggest that Indians who drop out are more likely to 
become unemployed, especially in the case of females. The marginal effect on unemployment for 
Indian females is 0.23, compared to only 0.08 for males, however we must be cautious about this 
result because it is based on a small number of observations. These findings may imply that young 
people from an ethnic minority background remain in education to avoid potential discrimination in 
the lower reaches of the labour market, or they may simply wish to close the qualification gap 
(Bradley and Taylor, 2002). Note, however, that there are also differences between ethnic groups, 
which may be due to cultural factors.  
 
We also find evidence of significant family background effects. For instance, the influence of 
parental occupation is significant but only where either parent is in a managerial, professional or a 
skilled non-manual occupation. There is a different effect for males and females. Females with a 
mother or father in a professional or managerial occupation are less likely to drop out, and to 
remain in education for longer, but if they do drop out they are more likely to get a job. In 
comparison, males who drop out are more likely to become unemployed. These findings may 
reflect an income effect, insofar as parents in professional and managerial occupations are more 
able to support their children in education, or to develop a taste for education within these families. 
There is also evidence that young males who live in social housing, where incomes are generally 
lower, are more likely to drop out and become unemployed.  
 
4.3  Attrition from the YCS   
 
Before we conclude, we turn to the problem of sample attrition, which can lead to biased estimates. 
This occurs where a non-random sample of respondents fail to respond to subsequent sweeps of the 
   Survey. The YCS suffers from the problem of attrition, particularly between sweeps 1 and 2, but 
this is more severe for young people who enter the labour market. For instance, in our data 60% of 
16 year olds proceed to post-compulsory education (18,796) and of these 60% (11,252) remain in 
the Survey throughout. In contrast, 40% (12,303) entered the labour market and of these only 47% 
remain in the Survey. Females are less likely to attrit than males. Of the 68% (23,240) who 
continued their education, 66% (15,339) remained in the Survey and the equivalent figure for 
labour market entrants was 54%. Thus, since our analysis is conditional on continuing to post-
compulsory education, attrition is a much less serious problem than an analysis of labour market 
entrants.  This is particularly true for females.  
 
Nevertheless, we take the possible effects of sample attrition seriously and pursue two strategies to 
explore further the potential bias that could be present in our previous analysis. In the first case we 
estimate two binary logit models of the decisions to continue in post-compulsory education and 
attrition from the Survey, so that we can ascertain what ‘type’ of young person is most likely to 
stay in education and which ‘type’ is most likely to attrit. The two response variables are: (i) 1 if 
the young person does not attrit from the Survey, 0 otherwise; and (ii) 1 if the young person stays 
on in post-compulsory education, 0 otherwise. The controls used for the staying on decision are 
those reported in Tables 1 and 2, whereas in the attrition equation we introduce an additional 
covariate, ‘item non-response’, following Dolton, Makepeace and Gannon (2001). This variable 
reflects the failure of respondents to answer fairly innocuous questions, which might reflect their 
intention to leave the Survey, but which is uncorrelated with the decision to stay on.  The results of 
this exercise are reported in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix. They are reassuring insofar as we 
find that those types of young people who are more likely to continue their education are less likely 
to attrit from the YCS. One important exception is that of Afro-Caribbeans who are morely likely 
than whites to continue in education but they are also more likely to attrit. Nevertheless, the results 
from this exercise are at least suggestive that attrition should not bias our estimates to any great 
extent. 
 
A second strategy for exploring the impact of attrition on our estimates is to estimate the Heckman 
and Singer models separately for each wave of the YCS, and then compare the estimates of these 
sub-models with the full model. If attrition bias is a big problem then we would expect the 
estimates from the sub-models to differ substantially from each other and from the full model. We 
undertake this exercise for the single risk and the competing risk models and the results are shown 
   in Tables A3-A10 in the Appendix. Examination of the results for the single risk models, which 
have more observations, show very little evidence of attrition bias. Virtually all of the variables that 
are statistically significant in the full model are also significant in each of the sub-models. There is 
no evidence that estimates switch sign and in most cases the absolute value of the estimates are 
very similar in magnitude. Turning to the competing risk models (see Tables A5-A10) the estimates 
exhibit more variation between sub-models and in comparison with the full model, however are 
also considerable similarities between these results. We are therefore confident that the results 




In this paper we analyse the magnitude, timing, determinants and outcomes of dropping out of post-
compulsory education in the UK over the period 1985-94. Using data from the YCS, versions 2 to 
6, and using nonparametric duration modeling techniques, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity 
and incorporating time varying covariates, we find that: 
 
•  1 in 10 young people who proceed to post-compulsory education in the early 1990s failed to 
complete their chosen course of study. This is a substantial number of young people but has 
fallen since the mid-1980s. 
•  The raw data shows that dropping out is more likely in April and July, which coincides with 
the recruitment cycle for young people.  
•  There is evidence of unobserved heterogeneity in the competing risks models, which shifts 
the baseline hazard of exit to employment upwards and that for exits to unemployment 
downwards, suggesting that there may be two groups of dropouts, the unobservably ‘good’ 
and the unobservably ‘bad’.  
•  The calculation of transition intensities reveals that in every month, conditional on having 
dropped out, it is more likely that young people exit to jobs, especially in the case of males.  
•  The variable exerting the strongest influence on the probability of dropping out is prior 
attainment. The risk of dropping out falls as one moves up the GCSE attainment ladder, with 
a discernable jump at the upper end.  
•  The risk of dropping out is lower for all ethnic minority groups, and there is some evidence of 
effects of prior schooling and family background. We find no evidence of any influence on 
the hazard of dropping out from labour market variables.  
    
As far as we are aware this is the first major empirical investigation of the decision to drop out of 
post-compulsory education for the UK. Our findings are encouraging insofar as dropouts are more 
likely to enter employment, however this may be overly optimistic since we have not attempted to 
assess the quality of those jobs. Dropping out for ‘dead-end’ jobs is potentially more damaging to 
the individual than remaining in education and graduating. We can conjecture that having made one 
false start, dropouts are more likely to miss out on other training opportunities in the youth labour 
market since these tend to begin at the same time as entry to post-compulsory education. If this was 
the case, then our findings raise serious policy implications insofar as the magnitude of the drop out 
problem is high and is concentrated on particular ‘types’ of young people. One possible solution is 
that better vocational guidance should be given about college and course choice. Another is the 
provision of pastoral care for young people who are considering dropping out, or the development 
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Figure 2 Dropping out of post-compulsory education, Males 
 



































































































































   Figure 3 Nonparametric baseline hazards, exits to employment, females  
 
Figure 4 Nonparametric baseline hazards, exits to unemployment, females 
 
 




Figure 6 Nonparametric baseline hazards, exits to unemployment, males 
 




  22Table 1 The incidence of dropping out by characteristics, females 
  
Characteristic  No in sample  Percentage who drop out 
 No  Yes 
School Background 
Comprehensive to age 16  7370 86.0  14.0 
Comprehensive to age 18  16717 86.2  13.8 
Secondary Modern  790 80.0  20.0 
Grammar or Independent  3138 94.6  5.4 
Other School  105 86.7  13.3 
Prior Attainment 
5+ GCSE grades A-C  14985 93.6  6.4 
1-4 GCSE grades A-C  9074 82.1  17.9 
5+ GCSE grades D-G  2149 77.1  22.9 
1-4 GCSE grades D-G  1397 68.8  31.2 
No GCSE grades  515 65.4  34.6 
Ethnicity 
Black 515 89.1  10.9 
Indian 684 92.1  7.9 
Bangladeshi or Pakistani  415 88.9  11.1 
Other race  565 87.8  12.2 
White 25596 86.7  13.3 
Family Structure 
no siblings  4331 85.6  14.4 
one sibling  13040 88.5  11.5 
two siblings  6437 86.7  13.3 
three siblings  2244 83.8  16.2 
four siblings  1418 83.5  16.5 
Social housing  3084 77.2  22.8 
Private housing  23307 88.3  11.7 
Both parents in employment  11171 87.5  12.5 
Neither parent in employment  2214 83.6  16.4 
One parent in employment  12169 87.6  12.4 
Lives with both parents  23709 87.7  12.3 
Lives with mother only  3276 84.2  15.8 
Lives with father only  535 82.6  17.4 
No parents present  367 75.2  24.8 
Socio-economic status 
Father Managerial or Professional 6210 92.9  7.1 
Father skilled non-manual  4551 90.0  10.0 
Father skilled manual  7460 83.2  16.8 
Father unskilled non-manual  2087 86.3  13.7 
Father unskilled manual  2589 84.7  15.3 
Father occupation unknown  5223 83.7  16.3 
Mother Managerial or Professional  2620 93.2  6.8 
Mother skilled non-manual  6542 89.8  10.2 
Mother skilled manual  2329 82.3  17.7 
Mother unskilled non-manual  6982 84.7  15.3 
Mother unskilled manual  1369 82.7  17.3 






  23Table 1 (continued) 
 
Characteristic  No in sample Proportion dropout 
 No  Yes 
  
Present in cohort 2  4071 83.7  16.3 
Present in cohort 3  4291 83.8  16.2 
Present in cohort 4  4418 85.8  14.2 
Present in cohort 5  5287 88.8  11.2 
Present in cohort 6  10053 89.0  11.0 
 
  24 
Table 2 The incidence of dropping out by characteristics, males 
 
Characteristic  No in sample  Percentage who drop out 
   No  Yes 
School Background 
    
Comprehensive to age 16  5524  86.6  13.4 
Comprehensive to age 18  13124  86.7  13.3 
Secondary Modern  516  80.2  19.8 
Grammar or Independent  3354  94.8  5.2 
Other School  124  83.9  16.1 
Prior Attainment 
5+ GCSE grades A-C  12838  94.4  5.6 
1-4 GCSE grades A-C  6601  82.7  17.3 
5+ GCSE grades D-G  1761  76.0  24.0 
1-4 GCSE grades D-G  1015  66.4  33.6 
No GCSE grades  427  64.2  35.8 
Ethnicity 
Black 344  83.4  16.6 
Indian 712  93.7  6.3 
Bangladeshi or Pakistani  513  89.3  10.7 
Other race  489  90.2  9.8 
White 20281  87.6  12.4 
Family Structure 
no siblings  3606  87.4  12.6 
one sibling  10570  88.7  11.3 
two siblings  5087  87.6  12.4 
three siblings  1764  86.5  13.5 
four siblings  1064  85.0  15.0 
Social housing  1958  78.1  21.9 
Private housing  19107  88.9  11.1 
Both parents in employment  9310  88.3  11.7 
Neither parent in employment  1653  84.8  15.2 
One parent in employment  9910  88.5  11.5 
Resides with both parents 19485  88.5  11.5 
Resides with mother only  2260  84.6  15.4 
Resides with father only  500  83.6  16.4 
No parents present  257  75.5  24.5 
Socio-economic status 
Father Managerial or Professional 5523  93.3 6.7 
Father skilled non-manual  4089  90.7  9.3 
Father skilled manual  5321  83.2  16.8 
Father unskilled non-manual  1819  87.2  12.8 
Father unskilled manual  1844  84.7  15.3 
Father occupation unknown  4046  84.8  15.2 
Mother Managerial or Professional  2311  92.9  7.1 
Mother skilled non-manual  5564  90.5  9.5 
Mother skilled manual  1543  84.0  16.0 
Mother unskilled non-manual  5077  86.0  14.0 
Mother unskilled manual  833  83.9  16.1 
Mother occupation unknown  7314  86.8  13.2 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
 
   
Characteristic  No in sample Proportion dropout 
 No  Yes 
Cohort 
Present in cohort 2  3058 83.5  16.5 
Present in cohort 3  3742 85.7  14.3 
Present in cohort 4  3519 86.6  13.4 
Present in cohort 5  4441 89.4  10.6 
Present in cohort 6  7882 89.9  10.1 
 
 




  Single risk model  Competing risks model 
      Employment   Unemployment  










  Odds ratio  ∂Prj/∂x  ∂Prj/∂x 
Comprehensive school (11-18)  0.114  0.008  -0.100  0.336 -0.105  0.009
 1.21  -0.008  0.008 
Secondary modern school  0.149  0.130  -0.227  0.197 -0.236  0.396
 1.161  0.006  -0.006 
Grammar/independent school  -0.354 0.000 0.477 0.003 0.495  0.014
 0.702  -0.023  0.023 
Other school  -0.129  0.701  -0.028  0.644 -0.015  0.093
  0.879 0.167  -0.167 
5+ GCSE A-C  -1.893  0.000  0.894  0.000 0.933  0.000
 0.151  0.052  -0.052 
1-4 GCSE A-C  -0.759  0.000  0.111  0.083 0.116  0.000
 0.468  0.072  -0.072 
5+ GCSE D-G  -0.353  0.001  -0.038  0.336 -0.037  0.000
 0.703  0.084  -0.084 
1-4 GCSE D-G  -0.026  0.813  -0.115  0.059 -0.117  0.067
  0.974 0.060  -0.060 
Afro-Caribbean -0.601  0.000  0.177  0.004 0.182  0.030
 0.548  -0.048  0.048 
Indian -0.867  0.000  0.251  0.000 0.257  0.046
 0.420  -0.234  0.234 
Bangladeshi/Pakistani -0.610  0.001  0.220  0.003 0.225  0.178
 0.543  -0.179  0.179 
Other race  -0.382  0.007  0.089  0.055 0.092  0.079
  0.682 -0.006  0.006 
One sibling at home  -0.184  0.001  0.040  0.127 0.042  0.001
 0.832  0.009  -0.009 
Two siblings  -0.087  0166  0.016  0.579 0.017  0.124
 0.917  0.007  -0.007 
Three siblings  0.064  0.413  -0.024  0.427 -0.025  0.671
 1.066  0.005  -0.005 
Four siblings  -0.068  0.475  0.034  0.275 0.035  0.875
 0.934  -0.018  0.018 
Lives in social housing  0.304  0.000  -0.071  0.006 -0.073  0.000
 1.355  -0.009  0.009 
Both parents work  0.087  0.051  -0.028  0.128 -0.029  0.306
 1.091  0.004  -0.004 
Neither parents work  -0.062  0.359  0.016  0.587 0.016  0.470
 0.940  0.001  -0.001 
Single parent - mother only  0.119  0.096  0.025  0.191 0.024  0.000
 1.126  -0.048  0.048 
Single parent - father only  0.379  0.008  -0.060  0.515 -0.063  0.014
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  Single risk model  
(r = 1,2) 
Competing risks model 
     Employment   
(r = 1) 
Unemployment 
(r = 2) 










 Odds  ratio  ∂Prj/∂x  ∂Prj/∂x 
Other household  0.631  0.000  -0.207  0.016 -0.215  0.000
 1.879  -0.025  0.025 
Father managerial/professional  -0.397  0.000  0.063  0.060 0.065  0.000
 0.672  0.020  -0.020 
Father skilled non-manual  -0.284  0.000  0.057  0.045 0.059  0.007
 0.753  0.002  -0.002 
Father skilled manual  -0.010  0.879  -0.019  0.383 -0.019  0.418
 0.990  0.015  -0.015 
Father unskilled non-manual  -0.033  0.697  0.002  0.973 0.002  0.697
 0.968  0.004  -0.004 
Father unknown occupation  0.092  0.224  -0.026  0.431 -0.026  0.321
 1.009  0.000  0.000 
Mother managerial/professional  -0.378  0.001  0.061  0.185 0.063  0.002
 0.685  0.015  -0.015 
Mother skilled non-manual  -0.271  0.002  0.042  0.218 0.044  0.009
 0.763  0.009  -0.009 
Mother skilled manual  -0.122  0.207  -0.010  0.649 -0.010  0.033
 0.885  0.033  -0.033 
Mother unskilled non-manual  -0.125  0.132  -0.007  0.706 -0.007  0.026
 0.882  0.027  -0.027 
Mother unknown occupation  -0.229  0.006  0.010  0.897 0.010  0.002
  0.795 0.030  -0.030 
Present in cohort 3  0.022  ???  0.713  0.532 -0.010  0.652
 1.022  0.009  -0.009 
Present in cohort 4  -0.173  0.029  0.070  0.000 0.072  0.949
 0.841  -0.040  0.040 
Present in cohort 5  -0.084  0.230  0.075  0.000 0.076  0.004
 0.919  -0.079  0.079 
Present in cohort 6  0.065  0.298  0.035  0.002 0.035  0.000
 1.067  -0.062  0.062 
logged unemployment rate  -0.019  0.727  0.006  0.003 0.006  0.120
 0.981  -0.034  0.034 
logged vacancy rate  0.030  0.620  -0.004  0.135 -0.004  0.439
 1.030  0.019  -0.019 
Individuals
b 2875  1386  1489 
Variance (σ
2
µ)  0 0.395  5.888 
Mass point 1 (probability)  -  -0.073 (0.987)  -3.361 (0.343)
Mass point 2 (probability)  -  5.384 (0.013)  1.752 (0.657)
Log likelihood  -15028.333  -8289.308  -8542.728 
 
a The probability value refers to the underlying parameter estimate on x.  
b Number of females exiting to the state described. Another 20439 females were censored. There are 332794 individual-month 
observations. 
 
 Table 4 Single risk and competing risk estimates of the determinants of dropping out of post-
compulsory education, Males
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  Single risk model  Competing risks model 













 Odds  ratio  ∂Prj/∂x  ∂Prj/∂x 
comprehensive to age18  0.082  0.102  -0.140 0.280 -0.142  0.244
 1.085  -0.001  0.001 
secondary modern  0.191  0.116  -0.356 0.292 -0.363  0.362
 1.210  0.000  0.000 
grammar/independent -0.366 0.000  0.701 0.001 0.705  0.054
 0.694  -0.012  0.012 
other school  0.320  0.183  -0.189 0.818 -0.194  0.033
  1.377 -0.052  0.052 
5+ gcse A-C  -2.329  0.000  1.566 0.000 1.548  0.000
 0.097  0.022  -0.022 
1-4 gcse A-C  -1.081  0.000  0.243 0.000 0.235  0.000
 0.339  0.021  -0.021 
5+ gcse D-G  -0.524  0.000  0.078 0.082 0.075  0.000
 0.592  0.032  -0.032 
1-4 gcse D-G  -0.171  0.145  0.042 0.392 0.041  0.403
  0.843 0.001  -0.001 
Afro-Caribbean -0.327  0.071  0.086 0.204 0.083  0.210
 0.720  0.002  -0.002 
Indian -1.247  0.000  0.267 0.000 0.257  0.000
 0.287  -0.082  0.082 
Bangladeshi/Pakistani  -0.623  0.000  0.226 0.000 0.218     0.144
 0.536  -0.082  0.082 
other race  -0.526  0.002  0.150 0.003 0.145     0.186
  0.591 -0.030  0.030 
one sibling  0.003  0.962  0.010 0.679 0.010  0.660
 1.003  -0.005  0.005 
two siblings  0.086  0.236  -0.029 0.307 -0.028  0.617
 1.090  0.003  -0.003 
three siblings  0.021  0.824  0.001 0.976 0.001  0.703
 1.021  -0.004  0.004 
four siblings  0.074  0.515  0.024 0.566 0.023  0.072
 1.077  -0.025  0.025 
social housing  0.277  0.000  -0.021 0.504 -0.020  0.000
 1.319  -0.027  0.027 
Both parents work  0.184  0.000  -0.049 0.021 -0.048  0.005
 1.202  -0.004  0.004 
Neither parents work  -0.033  0.688  0.004 0.914 0.004  0.543
 0.968  0.004  -0.004 
household-mother only  0.192  0.022  0.026 0.448 0.025  0.000
 1.212  -0.036  0.036 
household-father only  0.265  0.091  -0.158 0.033 -0.153  0.854




Table 4 (continued)  
 
     Employment  Unemployment 












 Odds  ratio  ∂Prj/∂x  ∂Prj/∂x 
household-other  0.651  0.000  -0.260 0.007  -0.253 0.000 
  1.917 -0.027  0.027 
Father  managerial/professional  -0.486  0.000 0.129  0.000 0.125  0.001 
 0.615  -0.009  0.009 
Father skilled non-manual  -0.368  0.000  0.093  0.000  0.090  0.040 
 0.692  -0.012  0.012 
Father skilled manual  -0.015  0.848  0.016  0.473  0.016  0.736 
 0.985  -0.007  0.007 
Father unskilled non-manual  -0.132  0.177  0.026  0.352  0.026  0.176 
 0.876  0.005  -0.005 
Father unknown occupation  -0.012  0.892  0.010  0.714  0.009  0.687 
 0.988  -0.006  0.006 
Mother  managerial/professional  -0.248  0.055 0.078  0.014 0.076  0.664 
 0.780  -0.023  0.023 
Mother skilled non-manual  -0.284  0.008  0.087  0.000  0.084  0.693 
 0.753  -0.031  0.031 
Mother skilled manual  -0.203  0.103  0.035  0.182  0.034  0.187 
 0.816  0.003  -0.003 
Mother unskilled non-manual  -0.094  0.373  0.037  0.088  0.036  0.997 
 0.910  -0.015  0.015 
Mother unknown occupation  -0.152  0.147  0.052  0.008  0.050  0.765 
  0.859 -0.027  0.027 
Present in cohort 3  -0.033  0.642  -0.023  0.111  -0.022  0.009 
 0.968  0.028  -0.028 
Present in cohort 4  -0.128  0.174  0.029  0.093  0.028  0.624 
 0.880  -0.009  0.009 
Present in cohort 5  -0.084  0.299  0.041  0.004  0.039  0.185 
 0.919  -0.031  0.031 
Present in cohort 6  -0.026  0.715  0.032  0.008  0.030  0.030 
  0.974 -0.032  0.032 
logged unemployment rate  0.038  0.551  0.005  0.056  0.005  0.031 
 1.039  -0.023  0.023 
logged vacancy rate  0.028  0.679  -0.003  0.435  -0.002  0.940 
 1.028  0.004  -0.004 
Individuals
b 2166  1046  1120 
Variance (σ
2
µ)  0 4.69e-09  12.327 
Mass point 1 (probability)  -  -2.5E-05 (0.880)  -3.072 (0.566) 
Mass point 2 (probability)  -  0.0002 (0.121)  4.013 (0.434) 
Log likelihood  -11217.251  -6167.2616  -6417.79 
a See note to table 3. 
b Number of males exiting to the state described. Another 16701 males were censored. The number of individual-month 
observations is 262859. 
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Table  A1 Binary logit models of the decisions to stay on and attrit, marginal effects 
 
Females Males 


















0.576  0.000 -0.220 0.000 0.673 0.000  -0.243 0.000
0.324  0.000 -0.106 0.000 0.407 0.000  -0.126 0.000
0.209  0.000 -0.074 0.000 0.279 0.000  -0.080 0.000
0.148  0.000 -0.048 0.000 0.174 0.000  -0.054 0.000
    
0.223  0.000 0.072 0.003 0.196 0.000  0.083 0.005
0.300  0.000 -0.020 0.324 0.468 0.000  0.014 0.511
0.205  0.000 -0.042 0.131 0.445 0.000  0.003 0.922
0.228  0.000 0.084 0.072 0.315 0.000  0.062 0.214
0.072  0.000 -0.004 0.851 0.173 0.000  0.015 0.483
    
0.009  0.265 -0.034 0.000 -0.043 0.000  0.008 0.414
-0.002  0.811 -0.020 0.031 -0.045 0.000  0.027 0.009
-0.031  0.006 -0.019 0.111 -0.068 0.000  0.019 0.135
-0.062  0.000 -0.003 0.821 -0.088 0.000  0.041 0.006
-0.060  0.000 0.007 0.436 -0.066 0.000  0.012 0.199
-0.001  0.851 -0.007 0.255 -0.010 0.176  0.018 0.011
 
 
Prior educational attainment 
5+ GCSE grades A-C 
1-4 GCSE grades A-C 
5+ GCSE grades D-G 













Both parents work 
Neither parents work  0.025  0.006 -0.035 0.000 0.033 0.007  -0.037 0.001
household-mother only  0.038  0.055 0.000 0.036 0.013  0.050 0.000
household-father only  -0.041  0.067 0.004 -0.007 0.789  0.035 0.130
household-other -0.209  0.149 0.000 -0.280 0.000  0.142 0.000
Socio-economic status         
Father managerial/professional  0.096  -0.036 0.001 0.140 0.000 -0.054 0.000
Father associate professional  0.053  -0.139 0.000 0.111 0.000  -0.169 0.000







0.000 0.000 0.115 0.000  -0.161 0.000
Father skilled manual  -0.011  0.199 -0.108 0.000 -0.011 0.329  -0.129 0.000
Father unskilled non-manual  0.043  0.000 -0.053 0.000 0.062 0.000  -0.081 0.000
Father occupation unknown  -0.002  0.814 0.088 0.000 0.013 0.289 0.099 0.000
Mother 
managerial/professional 
0.092 0.000 0.009 0.552 0.155 0.000 0.015 0.385
Mother associate professional  0.065  0.000 -0.021 0.175 0.114 0.000  -0.046 0.010
Mother clerical  0.076  0.000 -0.086 0.000 0.104 0.000  -0.094 0.000
Mother skilled manual  -0.028  0.041 -0.206 0.000 -0.012 0.508  -0.220 0.000
Mother unskilled non-manual  0.013  0.243 -0.147 0.000 0.034 0.021  -0.181 0.000
Mother occupation unknown  0.017  0.125 -0.064 0.000 0.040 0.007  -0.057 0.000
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School type      
comprehensive 18  0.037  0.000 -0.012 0.049 0.055 0.000  -0.014 0.041
secondary modern  0.002  0.900 -0.055 0.000 -0.040 0.038  -0.033 0.060
grammar/independent 0.160  0.000 -0.091 0.000 0.228 0.000 -0.047 0.000
other school  0.025  0.555 -0.033 0.487 0.029 0.477  -0.014 0.742
(log) unemployment rate  -0.024  0.001 -  -  -0.016 0.080  -  - 
Item non-response  -  -  0.074 0.000 -  -  0.068 0.000
Regional dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.275 0.078 0.340 0.081 
Number  of  observations  34,306 34,306 31,099 31,110 
Log  Likelihood  -15643.40 -20977.83 -13779.95 -19674.11 
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of the full model and sub-models, females 
  Present in sweep 1  Present sweeps 1 & 2  Present sweeps 1-3  Full model 
  coef  prob value coef  prob value coef  prob value  coef  prob value
  (s.e.)   (s.e.)    (s.e.)    (s.e.)  
5+ GCSE grades A-C  -1.506  0.000  -1.880  0.000  -1.915  0.000  -1.893  0.000 
  (0.157)   (0.139)   (0.137)  (0.104)   
1-4 GCSE grades A-C  -0.659 0.000  -0.714 0.000  -0.755 0.000  -0.759  0.000 
  (0.151)   (0.135)   (0.134)  (0.100)   
5+ GCSE grades D-G   -0.639 0.000  -0.298 0.042  -0.311 0.031  -0.353  0.001 
  (0.170)   (0.146)   (0.144)  (0.109)   
1-4 GCSE grades D-G   -0.227 0.186  0.114 0.439  0.085 0.561  -0.026  0.813 
  (0.172)   (0.148)   (0.146)  (0.111)   
Afro-Caribbean  -0.956 0.001  -0.686 0.003  -0.634 0.003  -0.601  0.000 
  (0.295)   (0.228)   (0.217)  (0.166)   
Indian  -1.168 0.000  -0.768 0.000  -0.886 0.000  -0.867  0.000 
  (0.306)   (0.182)   (0.182)  (0.153)   
Bangladeshi/Pakistani  -2.063 0.000  -0.760 0.002  -0.556 0.010  -0.610  0.001 
  (0.586)   (0.248)   (0.217)  (0.180)   
Other ethnic group  -0.601 0.022  -0.525 0.005  -0.393 0.019  -0.382  0.007 
  (0.262)   (0.188)   (0.167)  (0.141)   
One sibling  -0.242 0.008  -0.226 0.002  -0.153 0.029  -0.184  0.001 
  (0.090)   (0.073)   (0.070)  (0.057)   
Two siblings  -0.112 0.257  -0.066 0.410  -0.056 0.460  -0.087  0.166 
  (0.099)   (0.080)   (0.076)  (0.063)   
Three siblings  0.027 0.829  0.120 0.219  0.132 0.163  0.064  0.413 
  (0.125)   (0.098)   (0.094)  (0.078)   
Four siblings  -0.051 0.740  -0.054 0.654  -0.081 0.494  -0.068  0.475 
  (0.154)   (0.121)   (0.119)  (0.095)   
Living in social housing  0.488 0.000  0.317 0.000  0.292 0.000  0.304  0.000 
  (0.083)   (0.069)   (0.067)  (0.054)   
Both parents work  0.196 0.006  0.097 0.088  0.069 0.204  0.087  0.051 
  (0.072)   (0.057)   (0.054)  (0.045)   
Neither parents work  -0.217 0.054  -0.064 0.465  -0.072 0.392  -0.062  0.359 
  (0.113)   (0.088)   (0.084)  (0.068)   
Household-mother only  0.148 0.191  0.210 0.017  0.182 0.036  0.119  0.096 
  (0.113)   (0.088)   (0.087)  (0.071)   
Household- father only  0.653 0.001  0.123 0.551  0.221 0.241  0.379  0.008 
  (0.196)   (0.207)   (0.188)  (0.144)   
Household-other  1.091 0.000  0.464 0.016  0.470 0.016  0.631  0.000 
  (0.175)   (0.193)   (0.196)  (0.138)   
Father managerial/professional  -0.315 0.011  -0.459 0.000  -0.454 0.000  -0.397  0.000 
  (0.125)   (0.098)   (0.095)  (0.077)   
Father skilled non-manual  -0.156 0.227  -0.335 0.001  -0.311 0.001  -0.284  0.000 
  (0.129)   (0.098)   (0.094)  (0.079)   
Father skilled manual  0.034 0.748  -0.095 0.245  -0.010 0.897  -0.010  0.879 
  (0.105)   (0.082)   (0.079)  (0.065)   
Father unskilled non-manual  -0.075 0.598  -0.145 0.184  -0.030 0.773  -0.033  0.697 
  (0.142)   (0.109)   (0.103)  (0.085)   
Father unknown occupation  0.200 0.093  0.058 0.549  0.076 0.423  0.092  0.224 
  (0.119)   (0.097)   (0.095)  (0.075)   
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Mother managerial/professional  -0.436 0.010  -0.310 0.037  -0.383 0.007  -0.378  0.001 
  (0.170)   (0.149)   (0.141)  (0.112)   
Mother skilled non-manual  -0.447 0.001  -0.156 0.169  -0.299 0.006  -0.271  0.002 
  (0.134)   (0.114)   (0.108)  (0.086)   
Mother skilled manual  -0.105 0.491  -0.058 0.645  -0.182 0.125  -0.122  0.207 
  (0.152)   (0.126)   (0.119)  (0.097)   
Mother unskilled non-manual  -0.208 0.101  -0.053 0.633  -0.118 0.257  -0.125  0.132 
  (0.126)   (0.110)   (0.104)  (0.083)   
Mother unknown occupation  -0.256 0.045  -0.220 0.051  -0.255 0.017  -0.229  0.006 
  (0.128)   (0.112)   (0.106)  (0.084)   
Comprehensive to age 18  0.091 0.196  0.190 0.001  0.157 0.003  0.114  0.008 
  (0.071)   (0.056)   (0.052)  (0.043)   
Secondary modern  0.165 0.328  0.240 0.049  0.271 0.016  0.149  0.130 
  (0.169)   (0.122)   (0.112)  (0.099)   
Grammar/independent  -0.423 0.010  -0.254 0.031  -0.341 0.002  -0.354  0.000 
  (0.164)   (0.118)   (0.111)  (0.095)   
Other school  0.025 0.960  0.318 0.373  0.226 0.502  -0.129  0.701 
  (0.504)   (0.358)   (0.337)  (0.336)   
Present in cohort 3  -0.008 0.942  -0.053 0.482  -0.020 0.779  0.022  0.713 
  (0.105)   (0.075)   (0.072)  (0.061)   
Present in cohort 4  -0.059 0.664  -0.175 0.068  -0.072 0.405  -0.173  0.029 
  (0.137)   (0.096)   (0.086)  (0.079)   
Present in cohort 5  0.147 0.231  -0.113 0.197  -0.126 0.128  -0.084  0.230 
  (0.123)   (0.087)   (0.083)  (0.070)   
 Present in cohort 6  0.106 0.297  0.002 0.976  0.009 0.910  0.065  0.298 
  (0.102)   (0.079)   (0.076)  (0.062)   
Log(unemployment rate)  0.219 0.019  -0.004 0.953  -0.011 0.858  -0.019  0.727 
  (0.094)   (0.069)   (0.063)  (0.054)   
Log (vacancy rate)  -0.012 0.900  0.000 0.997  0.036 0.623  0.030  0.620 
  (0.099)   (0.078)    (0.074)    (0.061)   
Individuals in sample  23314  17839  15380  23314 
Number of observations  114243  257801  269756  332794 
Note: Sweep 1 = all individuals and 5 time periods; Sweep 1+2 = only those present in sweeps 1 + 2 and 17 time 
periods; Sweep 3 = only those present in all three sweeps and 20 time periods. 
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of the full model and sub-models, males 
  Present in sweep 1  Present sweeps 1 & 2  Present sweeps 1-3  Full model 
  coef  prob value coef  prob value  coef  prob value  coef  prob value
  (s.e.)  (s.e.)  (s.e.)    (s.e.)  
5+ GCSE grades A-C  -1.976  0.000  -2.538  0.000  -2.273  0.000  -2.329  0.000
 (0.163)    (0.139)   (0.148)    (0.107)   
1-4 GCSE grades A-C  -1.004  0.000 -1.181 0.000  -1.029 0.000  -1.081  0.000
  (0.154)   (0.134)   (0.146)   (0.103)  
5+ GCSE grades D-G   -0.627  0.000 -0.530 0.000  -0.436 0.006  -0.524  0.000
  (0.169)   (0.145)   (0.158)   (0.112)  
1-4 GCSE grades D-G   -0.340  0.057 -0.178 0.241  0.084 0.611  -0.171  0.145
 (0.179)    (0.152)   (0.164)    (0.117)   
Afro-Caribbean  -0.345  0.242 -0.358 0.128  -0.364 0.122  -0.327  0.071
  (0.295)   (0.235)   (0.235)   (0.181)  
Indian  -1.553  0.000 -1.285 0.000  -1.386 0.000  -1.247  0.000
  (0.359)   (0.225)   (0.236)   (0.176)  
Bangladeshi/Pakistani  -1.079  0.001 -0.684 0.002  -0.795 0.001  -0.623  0.000
  (0.319)   (0.218)   (0.231)   (0.165)  
Other ethnic group  -0.756  0.013 -0.310 0.104  -0.377 0.060  -0.526  0.002
  (0.306)   (0.191)   (0.201)   (0.166)  
One sibling  0.045  0.674 -0.061 0.461  0.032 0.696  0.003  0.962
  (0.106)   (0.083)   (0.082)   (0.066)  
Two siblings  0.145  0.216 -0.007 0.939  0.010 0.913  0.086  0.236
  (0.117)   (0.092)   (0.093)   (0.073)  
Three siblings  -0.015  0.925 -0.090 0.456  -0.037 0.762  0.021  0.824
  (0.157)   (0.121)   (0.121)   (0.094)  
Four siblings  0.193  0.281 0.047 0.738  0.145 0.312  0.074  0.515
  (0.179)   (0.142)   (0.143)   (0.113)  
Living in social housing  0.349  0.001 0.254 0.004  0.212 0.021  0.277 0.000 
  (0.103)   (0.088)   (0.091)   (0.068)   
Both parents work  0.259  0.002 0.168 0.011  0.119 0.063  0.184 0.000 
  (0.083)   (0.066)   (0.064)   (0.051)   
Neither parents work  -0.010  0.941 0.051 0.627  -0.027 0.803  -0.033 0.688 
  (0.130)   (0.105)   (0.108)   (0.083)   
Household-mother only  0.295  0.021 0.174 0.107  0.068 0.544  0.192 0.022 
  (0.128)   (0.108)   (0.112)   (0.084)   
Household- father only  0.191  0.466 0.108 0.617  0.239 0.248  0.265 0.091 
  (0.262)   (0.216)   (0.207)   (0.157)   
Household-other  0.881  0.000 0.534 0.015  0.391 0.127  0.651 0.000 
  (0.244)   (0.220)   (0.256)   (0.167)   
Father managerial/professional  -0.740  0.000 -0.599 0.000  -0.560 0.000  -0.486 0.000 
  (0.141)   (0.116)   (0.114)   (0.088)   
Father skilled non-manual  -0.455  0.001 -0.397 0.000  -0.413 0.000  -0.368 0.000 
  (0.143)   (0.113)   (0.112)   (0.090)   
Father skilled manual  -0.112  0.334 -0.081 0.406  -0.098 0.323  -0.015 0.848 
  (0.116)   (0.098)   (0.099)   (0.077)   
Father unskilled non-manual  -0.331  0.038 -0.136 0.271  -0.151 0.223  -0.132 0.177 
  (0.159)   (0.123)   (0.124)   (0.098)   
Father unknown occupation  -0.006  0.963 -0.148 0.205  -0.108 0.358  -0.012 0.892 
  (0.131)   (0.117)   (0.118)   (0.088)   
 
  35Mother managerial/professional  -0.266  0.175 -0.319 0.065  -0.261 0.132  -0.248 0.055 
  (0.196)   (0.173)   (0.173)   (0.129)   
Mother skilled non-manual  -0.322  0.047 -0.336 0.017  -0.355 0.013  -0.284 0.008 
  (0.162)   (0.141)   (0.143)   (0.107)   
Mother skilled manual  -0.219  0.272 -0.194 0.218  -0.215 0.176  -0.203 0.103 
  (0.199)   (0.157)   (0.159)   (0.124)   
Mother unskilled non-manual  -0.083  0.595 -0.114 0.403  -0.119 0.396  -0.094 0.373 
  (0.157)   (0.137)   (0.140)   (0.105)   
Mother unknown occupation  -0.179  0.251 -0.216 0.119  -0.208 0.142  -0.152 0.147 
  (0.156)   (0.139)   (0.142)   (0.105)   
Comprehensive to age 18  -0.084  0.291 0.169 0.009  0.171 0.007  0.082 0.102 
  (0.080)   (0.065)   (0.064)   (0.050)   
Secondary modern  0.050  0.813 0.310 0.035  0.406 0.005  0.191 0.116 
  (0.209)   (0.147)   (0.144)   (0.122)   
Grammar/independent  -0.443  0.008 -0.362 0.006  -0.390 0.002  -0.366 0.000 
  (0.168)   (0.132)   (0.126)   (0.099)   
Other school  0.569  0.114 0.320 0.297  0.336 0.254  0.320 0.183 
  (0.360)   (0.307)   (0.295)   (0.240)   
Present in cohort 3  0.049  0.695 -0.154 0.074  -0.061 0.473  -0.033 0.642 
  (0.126)   (0.086)   (0.085)   (0.071)   
Present in cohort 4  -0.183  0.299 -0.216 0.054  0.017 0.872  -0.128 0.174 
  (0.176)   (0.112)   (0.104)   (0.094)   
Present in cohort 5  0.115  0.422 -0.152 0.129  -0.162 0.104  -0.084 0.299 
  (0.143)   (0.100)   (0.100)   (0.080)   
 Present in cohort 6  0.165  0.167 -0.177 0.055  -0.145 0.114  -0.026 0.715 
  (0.120)   (0.092)   (0.092)   (0.072)   
Log(unemployment rate)  0.044  0.692 -0.033 0.679  0.092 0.223  0.038 0.551 
  (0.111)   (0.080)   (0.075)   (0.063)   
Log(Vacancy rate)  -0.010  0.929 0.123 0.165  0.055 0.528  0.028 0.679 
  (0.113)   (0.089)   (0.086)   (0.069)   
Individuals in sample  18867  13666  11276  18867 
Number of observations  92744  198175  201534  262859 
See note to Table A3.  
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and sub-models, employment, females 
 
  Present in sweep 1  Present sweeps 1 and 2  Present sweeps 1-3  Full model 
  coef  prob value  coef  prob value  coef  prob value  coef  prob value
  (s.e.)      (s.e.)    (std err)    (std err)   
5+ GCSE grades A-C  -0.843  0.004  -1.266  0.000  -1.437  0.000  -1.767    0.000
  (0.296)          (0.240)   (0.234)   (0.213)  
1-4 GCSE grades A-C  -0.070                0.803 -0.187 0.427 -0.255 0.268 -0.340 0.083
(0.282)          (0.236)   (0.230)   (0.196)  
5+ GCSE grades D-G   0.063                0.833 0.196 0.433 0.156 0.521 0.200 0.336
(0.299)          (0.250)   (0.244)   (0.207)  
1-4 GCSE D-G   0.381                0.205 0.450 0.074 0.467 0.057 0.395 0.059
  (0.301)          (0.252)   (0.245)   (0.210)  
Afro-Caribbean  -1.041                0.025 -0.933 0.015 -0.962 0.012 -1.023 0.004
(0.463)          (0.383)   (0.382)   (0.359)  
Indian  -2.989                0.003 -1.742 0.000 -2.262 0.000 -3.036 0.000
(1.007)          (0.413)   (0.504)   (0.538)  
Bangladeshi/Pakistani  -2.393                0.018 -1.687 0.004 -1.763 0.003 -2.337 0.003
(1.015)          (0.587)   (0.587)   (0.782)  
Other ethnic group  -0.788                0.047 -0.423 0.086 -0.451 0.060 -0.433 0.055
(0.396)        (0.246)   (0.240)   (0.225) 
One sibling  -0.035                0.795 -0.251 0.016 -0.087 0.404 -0.158 0.127
(0.133)          (0.104)   (0.104)   (0.103)  
Two siblings  -0.055                0.709 -0.099 0.379 -0.005 0.962 -0.062 0.579
(0.147)          (0.113)   (0.113)   (0.111)  
Three siblings  0.066                0.723 0.096 0.484 0.195 0.152 0.105 0.427
(0.186)          (0.136)   (0.136)   (0.132)  
Four siblings  0.087                0.702 -0.234 0.189 -0.205 0.259 -0.185 0.275
(0.228)          (0.178)   (0.182)   (0.169)  
Living in social housing  0.457                0.000 0.296 0.003 0.205 0.038 0.255 0.006
(0.124)          (0.099)   (0.099)   (0.093)  
Both parents work  0.224                0.027 0.128 0.111 0.105 0.174 0.117 0.128
(0.101)          (0.080)   (0.078)   (0.077)  
 
  37Neither parent works  -0.402                0.023 -0.064 0.618 -0.049 0.692 -0.064 0.587
(0.177)          (0.128)   (0.125)   (0.118)  
Household-mother only  -0.328                0.095 -0.065 0.641 -0.031 0.822 -0.185 0.191
(0.196)        (0.139)   (0.136)   (0.142) 
Household- father only  0.586                0.051 0.269 0.320 0.136 0.628 0.172 0.515
(0.301)          (0.271)   (0.281)   (0.265)  
Household-other  1.007                0.001 0.313 0.267 0.395 0.161 0.570 0.016
(0.299)        (0.282)   (0.282)   (0.237) 
Father managerial/professional  -0.296                0.098 -0.309 0.031 -0.367 0.009 -0.268 0.060
(0.179)        (0.144)   (0.141)   (0.142) 
Father skilled non-manual  -0.226                0.224 -0.321 0.025 -0.327 0.017 -0.284 0.045
(0.186)          (0.143)   (0.137)   (0.141)  
Father skilled manual  0.060                0.690 -0.001 0.995 0.015 0.900 0.103 0.383
(0.151)          (0.122)   (0.118)   (0.118)  
Father unskilled non-manual  0.048                0.806 -0.208 0.204 -0.082 0.591 -0.005 0.973
  (0.196)          (0.163)   (0.153)   (0.154)  
Father unknown occupation  0.156                0.376 0.092 0.532 0.015 0.920 0.110 0.431
(0.176)          (0.147)   (0.146)   (0.140)  
Mother managerial/professional  -0.295                0.237 -0.249 0.306 -0.220 0.331 -0.299 0.185
(0.249)          (0.244)   (0.226)   (0.226)  
Mother skilled non-manual  -0.497                0.018 -0.016 0.933 -0.287 0.106 -0.207 0.218
(0.210)          (0.187)   (0.178)   (0.168)  
Mother skilled manual  0.137                0.529 0.169 0.393 -0.010 0.958 0.081 0.649
(0.218)          (0.198)   (0.185)   (0.177)  
Mother unskilled non-manual  -0.072                0.710 0.176 0.332 0.040 0.812 0.060 0.706
(0.194)        (0.182)   (0.170)   (0.159) 
Mother unknown occupation  -0.160                0.419 0.020 0.914 -0.121 0.488 -0.021 0.897
(0.198)          (0.185)   (0.174)   (0.163)  
Comprehensive to age 18  0.077                0.439 0.147 0.061 0.057 0.436 0.070 0.336
(0.100)          (0.078)   (0.074)   (0.073)  
Secondary modern  0.023                0.927 0.306 0.063 0.297 0.050 0.196 0.197
(0.251)          (0.164)   (0.152)   (0.152)  
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-0.497                0.031 -0.274 0.091 -0.362 0.021 -0.595 0.003
(0.231)          (0.162)   (0.157)   (0.201)  
0.692                0.202 0.822 0.033 0.723 0.045 0.214 0.644
(0.542)          (0.385)   (0.360)   (0.464)  
-0.028                0.847 0.052 0.592 -0.049 0.602 0.057 0.532
(0.144)          (0.097)   (0.093)   (0.092)  
-0.015                0.934 -0.300 0.019 -0.296 0.012 -0.465 0.000
       
Grammar/independent 
Other school 
Present in cohort 3 
Present in cohort 4 
(0.179) (0.128) (0.117) (0.131)
Present in cohort 5  -0.050                0.775 -0.561 0.000 -0.671 0.000 -0.614 0.000
(0.175)          (0.129)   (0.124)   (0.126)  
 Present in cohort 6  -0.084                0.559 -0.357 0.002 -0.481 0.000 -0.333 0.002
(0.144)        (0.114)   (0.112)   (0.108) 
Log(unemployment rate)  0.143                0.260 -0.149 0.108 -0.120 0.166 -0.267 0.003
(0.127)          (0.093)   (0.087)   (0.090)  
Log(vacancy rate)  0.083                0.557 0.123 0.276 0.164 0.131 0.154 0.135
(0.141)        (0.113)   (0.108)   (0.103) 
Individuals in sample  23314  17839  15380  23314 
Number of observations  114243  257801  269756  332794 
       
See Note to Table A3. 
  39Table A6 Competing risk estimates of the determinants of dropping out of post-compulsory education: A comparison of the full model 
and sub-models, unemployment, females 
 
  Present in sweep 1  Present sweeps 1 and 2  Present sweeps 1-3  Full model 
  coef  prob value  coef  prob value  coef  prob value  Coef  prob value
  (s.e.)      (s.e.)    (s.e.)    (s.e.)  
5+ GCSE grades A-C  -1.969  0.000  -2.499  0.000  -2.452  0.000  -2.364 0.000
  (0.197)          (0.221)   (0.218)   (0.169)  
1-4 GCSE grades A-C  -1.012              0.000 -1.210 0.000 -1.258 0.000 -1.169 0.000
(0.183)          (0.207)   (0.207)   (0.149)  
5+ GCSE grades D-G   -1.111              0.000 -0.733 0.001 -0.742 0.001 -0.767 0.000
(0.219)          (0.219)   (0.222)   (0.158)  
1-4 GCSE grades D-G   -0.582              0.008 -0.101 0.641 -0.165 0.466 -0.287 0.067
  (0.218)        (0.217)   (0.227)   (0.157) 
Afro-Caribbean  -0.942              0.015 -0.547 0.077 -0.465 0.119 -0.473 0.030
(0.388)          (0.309)   (0.298)   (0.218)  
Indian  -0.464              0.154 -0.319 0.148 -0.359 0.097 -0.350 0.046
(0.326)          (0.220)   (0.217)   (0.176)  
Bangladeshi/Pakistani  -1.875              0.009 -0.434 0.148 -0.268 0.316 -0.290 0.178
(0.722)        (0.300)   (0.268)   (0.215) 
Other ethnic group  -0.432              0.228 -0.692 0.024 -0.447 0.079 -0.368 0.079
(0.359)        (0.306)   (0.255)   (0.209) 
One sibling  -0.476              0.000 -0.217 0.048 -0.237 0.021 -0.263 0.001
(0.129)          (0.110)   (0.103)   (0.082)  
Two siblings  -0.157              0.251 -0.027 0.821 -0.099 0.382 -0.138 0.124
(0.137)          (0.120)   (0.113)   (0.090)  
Three siblings  0.001              0.998 0.158 0.294 0.100 0.491 0.048 0.671
(0.173)          (0.150)   (0.145)   (0.114)  
Four siblings  -0.185              0.397 0.113 0.526 0.029 0.868 0.021 0.875
(0.218)          (0.178)   (0.174)   (0.134)  
Living in social housing  0.524            0.000 0.374 0.001 0.415 0.000 0.353 0.000
(0.117)          (0.108)   (0.103)   (0.081)  
Both parents work  0.169              0.111 0.074 0.382 0.043 0.598 0.067 0.306
(0.106)          (0.085)   (0.082)   (0.065)  
 
  40Neither parents work  -0.080              0.598 -0.091 0.487 -0.137 0.288 -0.071 0.470
(0.151)          (0.131)   (0.129)   (0.098)  
Household-mother only  0.513              0.000 0.481 0.000 0.424 0.001 0.365 0.000
(0.142)          (0.127)   (0.130)   (0.102)  
Household- father only  0.750              0.006 -0.040 0.907 0.371 0.202 0.522 0.014
(0.273)          (0.343)   (0.291)   (0.213)  
Household-other  1.209              0.000 0.739 0.019 0.762 0.028 0.861 0.000
(0.238)          (0.314)   (0.347)   (0.244)  
Father managerial/professional  -0.344              0.055 -0.611 0.000 -0.555 0.000 -0.501 0.000
(0.179)          (0.143)   (0.137)   (0.109)  
Father skilled non-manual  -0.078              0.674 -0.342 0.018 -0.308 0.026 -0.301 0.007
(0.185)          (0.145)   (0.139)   (0.112)  
Father skilled manual  -0.001              0.997 -0.178 0.137 -0.030 0.800 -0.074 0.418
(0.150)          (0.120)   (0.117)   (0.092)  
Father unskilled non-manual  -0.241              0.266 -0.098 0.531 0.009 0.954 -0.047 0.697
  (0.217)          (0.156)   (0.151)   (0.121)  
Father unknown occupation  0.234              0.159 0.044 0.754 0.145 0.297 0.105 0.321
(0.166)          (0.140)   (0.139)   (0.106)  
Mother managerial/professional  -0.570              0.019 -0.323 0.106 -0.526 0.008 -0.466 0.002
(0.243)          (0.200)   (0.197)   (0.152)  
Mother skilled non-manual  -0.389              0.032 -0.209 0.183 -0.311 0.043 -0.306 0.009
(0.182)          (0.157)   (0.154)   (0.117)  
Mother skilled manual  -0.411              0.071 -0.219 0.231 -0.391 0.030 -0.298 0.033
(0.228)          (0.183)   (0.180)   (0.140)  
Mother unskilled non-manual  -0.356              0.043 -0.213 0.165 -0.279 0.065 -0.253 0.026
(0.176)          (0.153)   (0.151)   (0.114)  
Mother unknown occupation  -0.350              0.044 -0.399 0.011 -0.391 0.011 -0.364 0.002
(0.174)          (0.156)   (0.153)   (0.115)  
Comprehensive to age 18  0.102              0.325 0.245 0.004 0.280 0.000 0.164 0.009
(0.104)          (0.084)   (0.080)   (0.063)  
Secondary modern  0.297              0.210 0.150 0.437 0.235 0.199 0.127 0.396
(0.238)          (0.193)   (0.183)   (0.149)  
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Grammar/independent  -0.340              0.154 -0.242 0.172 -0.316 0.053 -0.334 0.014
(0.239)          (0.177)   (0.163)   (0.136)  
Other school     -  -  -1.073  0.295  -1.262  0.219  -1.697 0.093
-        - (1.024)   (1.026)   (1.011) 
Present in cohort 3  0.029              0.858 -0.246 0.053 -0.019 0.874 -0.045 0.652
(0.161)          (0.127)   (0.123)   (0.099)  
Present in cohort 4  -0.209              0.356 -0.057 0.707 0.168 0.229 -0.008 0.949
(0.226)          (0.153)   (0.140)   (0.122)  
Present in cohort 5  0.370              0.041 0.328 0.012 0.403 0.001 0.292 0.004
(0.181)          (0.130)   (0.126)   (0.103)  
 Present in cohort 6  0.311              0.039 0.367 0.002 0.484 0.000 0.383 0.000
(0.151)        (0.120)   (0.117)   (0.092) 
Log(unemployment rate)  0.315              0.025 0.172 0.111 0.089 0.365 0.127 0.120
(0.140)          (0.108)   (0.098)   (0.082)  
Log(vacancy rate)  -0.115              0.421 -0.089 0.432 -0.052 0.627 -0.067 0.439
(0.143)        (0.114)   (0.108)   (0.086) 
Individuals in sample  23314  17839  15380  23314 
Number of observations  114243  257801  269756  332794 
See Note to Table A3.
  42Table A6 Competing risk estimates of the determinants of dropping out of post-compulsory education: A comparison of the full model 
and sub-models, employment, males 
 
  Present in sweep 1  Present sweeps 1 and 2  Present sweeps 1-3  Full model 
  coef  prob value  coef  prob value  coef  prob value  coef  prob value
  (s.e.)    (s.e.)        (s.e.)    (s.e.)  
-1.937  -2.330  0.000  -2.349  0.000 
(0.233)  (0.256)  (0.213)  (0.161)  
1-4 GCSE grades A-C  -0.931       0 000      0.000 -0.929 0.000  -1.027 . -0.974 0.000
(0.221)        (0.154)     (0.230)   (0.208)
-0.361 . -0.159 0   -0.235 0.288
(0.237)           (0.231) (0.222)   (0.165)  
1-4 GCSE grades D-G   -  0 075   .852         0.468 . -0.045 0   -0.030 0.899 -0.150 0.392
 (0.263)  (0.243)         (0.234)  (0.175) 
-0.346 . -0.389 0   -0.279 0.392 -0.335 0.204
(0.419)           (0.348) (0.325)   (0.264)  
Indian  -2.454           0 000  0.001 -1.952 0.000  -2.624 0.000 -2.219 .
(0.713)           (0.435)  (0.583)   (0.382)
Bangladeshi/Pakistani  -2.143 0 003    0 001  0 001   0 000  . -1.736 .   -1.752 . -1.670 .
(0.724)           (0.524) (0.516) (0.390) 
-0.950 0.037 -0.591 0   -0.851 0.018 -0.818 0.003
(0.454)          (0.317) (0.358)   (0.271) 
One sibling  0.140     .117      0.679  0.348 -0.186 0   -0.030 0.800 -0.039
(0.149)             (0.119) (0.119)   (0.095)
Two siblings  0.270              0.096 -0.035 0.788  0.021 0.872 0.106 0.307
(0.162)          (0.130)   (0.132)   (0.104)  
Three siblings  0.159 0 455            . -0.191 0.279  -0.027 0.876 -0.004 0.976
(0.212)         (0.177)   (0.171)   (0.135)  
0.044 0.871 -0.187 0.387  -0.016 0.939 -0.099 .
(0.273)           (0.216)   (0.213)   (0.173)
Living in social housing  -0.025 0 874     0 568      . 0.116 0.383  0.077 . 0.069 0.504
(0.157)          (0.133)  (0.135) (0.103)  
Both parents work  0.229           0 021  0.039 0.157 0.105  0.078 0.401 0.168 .
(0.111)           (0.097)   (0.093)   (0.073)
5+ GCSE grades A-C  0.000  -2.262 0.000 
         
5+ GCSE grades D-G    0 128   .492     -0.288 0.082 
Afro-Caribbean   0 408   .264        
Other race       .062        
Four siblings             0 566 
 
  43Neither parents work  0.042              0.818 0.074 0.638  -0.046 0.773 -0.013 0.914
(0.184)          (0.157)   (0.158)   (0.124)  
Household-mother only  -0.225              0.305 -0.104 0.551  -0.081 0.638 -0.103 0.448
(0.220)          (0.174)  (0.172)   (0.136)  
Household- father only  0.397              0.223 0.367 0.184  0.605 0.018 0.444 0.033
(0.326)          (0.277)  (0.255)   (0.208)  
Household-other  0.798          0.023 0.642 0.050  0.587 0.072 0.639 0.007
(0.352)          (0.327)  (0.326)   (0.236)  
Father managerial/professional  -0.826              0.000 -0.616 0.000  -0.677 0.000 -0.594 0.000
(0.192)        (0.174)  (0.170)   (0.130) 
Father skilled non-manual  -0.539           0.000  0.005 -0.563 0.001  -0.522 0.001 -0.482
(0.191)           (0.167)   (0.161)   (0.129)
Father skilled manual  -               0.212 0.177 -0.100 0.486  -0.143 0.316 -0.079 0.473
(0.157)          (0.143)  (0.142)   (0.110)  
Father unskilled non-manual  -0.377          -0.129 0.352  0.078 -0.112 0.526  -0.152 0.388
  (0.214)           (0.177)  (0.177)   (0.139)
Father unknown occupation  0.019              0.915 -0.101 0.565  -0.059 0.729 -0.047 0.714
(0.179)          (0.175)  (0.170)   (0.128)  
Mother managerial/professional  -0.447           0 014  0.093 -0.602 0.019  -0.553 0.040 -0.464 .
(0.266)           (0.256)  (0.269)   (0.188)
Mother skilled non-manual  -0.559              0.009 -0.700 0.001  -0.629 0.003 -0.573 0.000
(0.215)          (0.205)  (0.208)   (0.152)  
Mother skilled manual  -0.255          -0.225 0.182  0.320 -0.356 0.099  -0.272 0.222
(0.256)           (0.216)   (0.222)   (0.169)
Mother unskilled non-manual  -               0.228 0.270 -0.329 0.085  -0.214 0.282 -0.249 0.088
(0.206)          (0.191)   (0.199)   (0.146)  
Mother unknown occupation  -0.384          -0.393 0.008  0.064 -0.547 0.006  -0.367 0.070
(0.207)          (0.198)   (0.202)   (0.148)  
-0.028 0.799 0.189 0   0.155 0.088 0.077 0.280
(0.108)            (0.093) (0.091)   (0.072)  
Secondary modern  0.058       0 114      0.835 0.189 0.397  0.330 . 0.182 0.292
(0.279)           (0.223)  (0.209) (0.172)  
Comprehensive to age 18       .043        
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Grammar/independent  -0.756              0.003 -0.427 0.029  -0.547 0.005 -0.477 0.001
(0.256)          (0.196)   (0.195)   (0.149)  
Other school  0.164 0 781        . 0.020 0.969  -0.062 0.903 0.088 0.818 
(0.590)       (0.512)   (0.507)   (0.383) 
0.099 0.547 0.169 0.154  0.118 0.305 0.153 0.111
(0.164)          (0.118)  (0.115)   (0.096)  
Present in cohort 4  -0.255 0 266     0 394      . -0.254 0.109  -0.125 . -0.221 0.093
(0.230)          (0.159)  (0.146) (0.132)  
Present in cohort 5  -0.037      0 003         0.846 -0.461 .   -0.480 0.001 -0.344 0.004
(0.193)            (0.153) (0.151)   (0.119)  
Present in cohort 6  -0.067      0 002         0.679 -0.436 .   -0.381 0.006 -0.282 0.008
(0.162)          (0.142) (0.138)   (0.106) 
-0.022 . -0.227 0.040  -0.181 0.083 -0.168 0.056
(0.148)         (0.111)   (0.104)   (0.088)  
Log(vacancy rate)  0.097     .297         0.533 0.137 0   0.190 0.139 0.079 0.435
(0.156)          (0.131) (0.128)   (0.101) 
Individuals in sample  18867  13666  11276  18867 
Number of observations  92744  198175  201534  262859 
Present in cohort 3               
Log(unemployment rate)   0 884           
See Note to Table A3. 
  45Table A7 Competing risk estimates of the determinants of dropping out of post-compulsory education: A comparison of the full model 
and sub-models, unemployment, males 
 
  Present in sweep 1  Present sweeps 1 and 2  Present sweeps 1-3  Full model 
  coef  prob value  coef  prob value  coef  prob value coef  prob value
  (s.e.)      (s.e.)    (s.e.)   (s.e.)  
5+ GCSE grades A-C  -2.060  0.000  -3.066  0.000  -2.872  0.000  -2.617    0.000
  (0.290)        (0.258)   (0.338)   (0.183) 
1-4 GCSE grades A-C  -1.077 0.000       0 000      -1.675 0.000 -1.557 . -1.313 0.000
(0.286)           (0.247)   (0.325) (0.175)  
5+ GCSE grades D-G  -0.979                0.002 -0.993 0.000 -1.095 0.001 -0.824 0.000
(0.322)          (0.272)   (0.344)   (0.193)  
0.157 0.672 -0.326 0.236 -0.058 0.868 -0.167 0.403
(0.371)   (0.276)   (0.347)   (0.200) 
Afro-Caribbean  -0.255            -0.361 0.210  0.626 -0.378 0.321 -0.487 0.249
(0.524)          (0.381)   (0.422)   (0.288)  
Indian  -1.055                0.021 -1.023 0.001 -1.035 0.001 -0.858 0.000
(0.459)          (0.299)   (0.300)   (0.222)  
Bangladeshi/Pakistani  -0.743                0.077 -0.434 0.137 -0.479 0.128 -0.315 0.144
(0.420)        (0.292)   (0.315)   (0.216) 
Other ethnic group  -0.661                0.166 -0.158 0.584 0.043 0.888 -0.318 0.186
(0.478)        (0.288)   (0.301)   (0.240) 
One sibling  -0.139                0.439 0.017 0.900 0.126 0.341 0.045 0.660
(0.180)          (0.136)   (0.132)   (0.102)  
Two siblings  -0.047                0.813 -0.007 0.962 -0.012 0.935 0.057 0.617
(0.198)          (0.152)   (0.151)   (0.114)  
Three siblings  -0.273             0 703  0.324 0.050 0.799 -0.099 0.622 0.056 .
(0.276)           (0.198)   (0.200)   (0.147)
Four siblings  0.471 0.107  0.330        0.135 0.409 0.078 0.309 0.072 
(0.292)          (0.221)   (0.232)   (0.172)  
Living in social housing  0.863             0 000  0.000 0.414 0.004 0.385 0.014 0.522 .
(0.168)           (0.145)   (0.157)   (0.107)
Both parents work  0.314 0.026  0.188            0.075 0.195 0.064 0.228 0.005
(0.141)          (0.106)   (0.105)   (0.081)  
1-4 GCSE grades D-G                 
       
 
  46Neither parents work  0.055 0.809       0.456      0.028 0.868 -0.136 -0.078 0.543
(0.228)          (0.169)   (0.182) (0.128)  
Household-mother only  0.749            0.000 0.448 0.006 0.320 0.077 0.498 0.000 
(0.194)        (0.162)   (0.181)   (0.125) 
-0.133 0.792 -0.295 0.448 -0.303 0.450 0.049 0.854
(0.506)          (0.388)   (0.400)   (0.267)  
Household-other  2.130         0 481  0.001 0.724 0.087 0.392 . 1.081 0.000 
(0.659)         (0.423)   (0.555) (0.305) 
-0.755 0.001 -0.614 . -0.529 0.003 -0.442 0.001
(0.235)         (0.178) (0.180)   (0.134) 
Father skilled non-manual  -0.391                0.107 -0.242 0.170 -0.326 0.075 -0.288 0.040
(0.243)          (0.177)   (0.183)   (0.140)  
Father skilled manual  0.022                0.916 -0.033 0.833 -0.069 0.678 0.041 0.736
(0.205)          (0.158)   (0.165)   (0.122)  
Father unskilled non-manual  -0.389                0.154 -0.169 0.397 -0.185 0.373 -0.212 0.176
  (0.273)          (0.200)   (0.208)   (0.157)  
Father unknown occupation  -0.008                0.972 -0.135 0.483 -0.087 0.669 0.057 0.687
(0.231)          (0.192)   (0.204)   (0.142)  
Mother managerial/professional  -0.083                0.806 -0.075 0.786 -0.207 0.468 -0.088 0.664
(0.338)          (0.277)   (0.285)   (0.203)  
Mother skilled non-manual  -0.087    -0.026 0.913  -0.299 0.239  -0.070 0.693  0.767
(0.295)           (0.239)   (0.253)   (0.177)
Mother skilled manual  -0.319            -0.280 0.187  0.397 -0.045 0.869 -0.349 0.224
(0.376)        (0.275)   (0.287)   (0.212) 
Mother unskilled non-manual  0.072            -0.001 0.997  0.807 0.070 0.768 -0.256 0.318
(0.294)          (0.237)   (0.256)   (0.177)  
Mother unknown occupation  -0.033            0.911 0.092 0.698 -0.174 0.494 0.052 0.765 
(0.293)          (0.237)   (0.254)   (0.175)  
Comprehensive to age 18  -0.188 0.172  0.163 0.113 0.209 0.045  0.091 0.244 
(0.137)          (0.103)   (0.104)   (0.078)  
Secondary modern  0.125            0.745 0.417 0.069 0.570 0.023 0.179 0.362 
(0.386)          (0.230)   (0.250)   (0.196)  
Household- father only                 
Father managerial/professional       0 001         
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        -0.258       
 
Grammar/independent  -0.205 0.399 -0.274 0.160 0.155 -0.275 0.054
(0.243)      (0.142)     (0.195)   (0.181)  
Other school  0.936 0.092  0.864            0.093 1.319 0.019 0.948 0.033
(0.556)        (0.515)   (0.563)   (0.445) 
Present in cohort 3  -0.061                0.790 -0.683 0.000 -0.404 0.007 -0.311 0.009
(0.231)          (0.152)   (0.150)   (0.119)  
Present in cohort 4  -0.082                0.791 -0.164 0.373 0.086 0.620 -0.074 0.624
(0.310)          (0.185)   (0.173)   (0.151)  
Present in cohort 5  0.433                0.089 0.208 0.183 0.101 0.516 0.163 0.185
(0.254)          (0.157)   (0.156)   (0.123)  
Present in cohort 6  0.489                0.018 0.098 0.489 0.060 0.677 0.239 0.030
(0.207)        (0.142)   (0.144)   (0.110) 
Log(unemployment rate)  0.131            0.217 0.031  0.497 0.179 0.171 0.340 0.005
(0.193)           (0.131)   (0.122)   (0.100)
Log(vacancy rate)  -0.183                0.324 0.189 0.165 0.010 0.942 0.008 0.940
(0.185)        (0.136)   (0.133)   (0.102) 
Individuals in sample  18867  13666  11276  18867 
Number of observations  92744  198175  201534  262859 
See Note to Table A3.  